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“You’ve hit the (post-)Keynesians at a weak point; they and the supply siders 
seem like the last unreconstructed growth hounds around. Didn’t Joan 
Robinson say something like, for all their talk of investment, the Keynesians 
have never asked investment in what?” (Doug Henwood, email comm., pkt net, 
30 August 1997) 
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1 Introduction: investment and systemic failure 
A growing economy requires investment in the future. Economics defines fixed capital 
investment as planned expenditure on plant and equipment (or Means Of Production, 
MOP) that furnishes the productive processes for future goods and services. In a capitalist 
economy this role is centrally located in the private market sector. Unless specified 
otherwise, the term ‘investment’ in this paper refers to private business fixed capital 
investment [1]. 
Investment needs to be greater than the rate of depreciation of ‘old’ MOP in order for 
a capitalist economy to grow. The standard ‘economics problem’ arises with the need for 
investment at high and stable levels to produce economic growth. This will deliver both 
private profit growth (microeconomic objective) and long-term secure employment 
(macroeconomic objective). Economics research has identified technological innovation 
as the factor initiating strong investment. The ‘technology problem’ arises with the need 
for firms to find ways to harness such innovation that provides stable growth in profits 
and employment [2]. 
Two forms of systemic failure have been identified in the attempted resolution of 
both the economics and technology problems. The first is instability of investment, 
exemplified by the increasingly volatile investment cycles exhibited in capitalist 
economies as the process of market deregulation has been extended over the last 15 
years. The increasing degree of market and technical uncertainty has generated these 
volatile investment cycles that result in cumulative boom in expansion and with it 
overcapacity. This is followed by strong sharp contractions in which there is a shift to 
speculative activities and debt-deflation [3–5; 6,pp.190–214]. 
The second is ecologically unsustainable investment which produces MOP that are 
inappropriate in terms of scale, location, and time, clearly identified most persuasively by 
Schumacher [7]. The aggregate impact of investment and the embodied technological 
solutions have been in the direction of decreasing ecological sustainability [8]. This has 
been occurring despite growing support for market-based environmental solutions in the 
1980s and 1990s [9–10]. The scale of investment (large sized with strong technological 
input), its location (with emphasis on industrial clusters), and its cumulative impact 
through time all point to systemic failure of private investment decision making in 
delivering an innovative capital goods structure that leads to a more sustainable 
ecological environment. From an ecological standpoint, significant structural adjustments 
to the current operation of the private investment climate are required. 
Both systemic failures point to the need to develop an investment strategy that 
addresses them conjointly. The next section argues that a post-Keynesian approach to this 
investment strategy is required due the limitations of the two extant approaches to 
sustainable development. The neoclassical substitution approach of environmental 
economics is unable to address the dual systemic failure, except on the basis of reducing 
conflicts to optimal cost-benefit algorithms. The ecological economics approach eschews 
the neoclassical resolution but is unable to handle the instability of investment that leads 
to market and technical uncertainty, rendering the optimal (or maximum) ecological scale 
of resource use impossible to implement. 
An ‘eco-sustainable framework’ for developing a post-Keynesian innovation policy is 
set out in Section 3 of the paper. The framework aims to provide a process by which to 
stimulate innovation with supportive public policy tools for the attainment of sustainable 
economic and ecological development. Harnessing innovation for sustainable 
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development is the overriding principle. The perspective is based on satisficing behaviour 
given endogenous private firm constraints created by the two systemic failures. These 
failures force private agents (i.e., managers) to operate within procedural rationality 
rather than optimal rationality. A new investment paradigm is encouraged that is both 
innovation-oriented and ecologically sustainable, such that the dilemma of sustainable 
economic growth and sustainable ecological diversity dissolves into a positive 
programme of cumulative causation. 
The final substantive section of this paper outlines practical application of this 
framework using concrete examples of ecological-based strategies and their integration 
into a complete innovation policy with a significant public and private investment 
strategy. A link is then clearly established from the traditional Keynesian investment 
planning approach to the emerging goal-oriented and strategic environmental approaches 
implicit in the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols. 
2 A question of methodology 
Robert Heilbroner warned about ‘Ecological Armageddon’ in a widely reprinted 1970 
article [11], yet more than 30 years later Davies [12] notes the alarm throughout the 
scientific and intellectual communities of humanity’s lack of recognition of its situation. 
Davies writes that: “Whereas a few decades ago the number of warning voices was few, 
there is now a growing chorus, and prominent, respected professional groups  
and organisations have been adding their authority to the call for new policies” 
[12,p.257]. One crucial policy required in this ecological perspective is a public 
investment strategy with technological progress that allows entrepreneurial innovation 
that is ecologically sensitive. Consistent with the objective of overcoming the two 
systemic failures described above, a post-Keynesian methodology for such an innovation 
policy is required. 
Interaction between the two systemic failures raises serious questions of the 
neoclassical market internalisation approach to environmental social costs, whether in the 
welfare (cost-benefit) or free market versions. Unstable and ecologically unsustainable 
path-dependent investment leads to volatile market signals creating conditions for 
technical uncertainty in expectations about the future that results in cumulative short-run 
instability and cumulative long-run systems failure. The work by Minsky [3] on financial 
instability and by Crotty [5] on growth-safety trade off in capital goods investment, show 
the cumulative volatility arising from market signals to investment (both financial and 
physical). Recent work on technology embodied in investment has shown the rise of 
severe cyclical activity whenever new technological systems predominate, whether it is 
the steam engine or electronic information technology [13]. Then, in the long run when 
technology becomes embedded, past technology decisions shape future investment 
decisions and myopic selection pressures operate against the automatic price response 
mechanism providing the appropriate ecologically sustainable technology coming forth 
[14,pp.372–379]. 
The new neoclassical growth models support the position in this paper of two forms 
of systemic failure arising out of the economics and technology problems. Economic 
instability implies cyclical swings in output that increases market uncertainty leading to 
delays or suspension of investment and Research and Development (R&D) in new 
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technologies [15,p.269]. This can increase environmental degradation even in a zero 
economic growth scenario [16]. From the ecological perspective, this problem implies 
additional environmental spillover costs for economic agents due to investment in 
unsustainable technologies. Benhaïm and Schembri [17,p.131] explain that neoclassical 
optimality prevents new growth models from providing any guidance for public or 
private investment strategies despite acknowledging systemic failures. The equilibrium-
optimality constructions cannot perceive sustainable development ‘other than a state to 
reach’ within very restrictive settings. Evolution of the system through technical change 
in historical time is not possible under optimality conditions. This neglects the important 
phases in business cycles and economic development for which different technological 
trajectories and associated dynamics need to be observed [18]. The neoclassical 
methodology is found wanting. 
An alternative methodology to the neoclassical position is required with the ability to 
develop investment strategies that create a predictable but strategic focus that induces 
innovation that is cumulatively changing towards an ecologically sustainable investment 
programme. Consideration should be given to the large literature developed by ecological 
economists [19]. Forstater [20,pp.17–18] explains that ecological economics has taken  
a pluralistic approach to methodological issues, but with common themes centred on  
pre-analytical vision and imagination, structural analysis, scenario storylines, and 
adaptive implementation paths. Forstater goes on to show that these themes effectively 
reject the neoclassical hypothetico-deductive method together with the positive/normative 
dichotomy, but are consistent with Adolph Lowe’s ‘Instrumental Analysis’. The most 
significant commonality between the two is the policy perspective of working backwards 
“from the vision of the desired ends to find sustainable paths for its attainment” [20,p.16]. 
When it comes to developing a framework for policy, Forstater argues that ecological 
economists have left this area “underdeveloped” [20,p.20]. This has left ecological 
economists with a policy framework that consists of an extension of neoclassical 
economics tools grafted onto a heterodox methodological perspective. Essentially it is 
‘constrained market environmentalism’ where the investment process operates in the 
same way as with neoclassical economics but with the crucial pre-analytic setting of an 
optimal (or maximum) scale of production [21,pp.36–49]. Size of the investment projects 
is predetermined, yet there exists market-based encouragement to develop ecologically 
sustainable technology. Investment instability will still create the same endogenous 
uncertainty problems that are identified with neoclassical economics. Michal Kalecki’s 
‘perspective planning’ can provide a more effective strategic innovation and investment 
policy framework that ameliorates uncertainty, but with a historically evolving approach 
that is consistent with the ecological economics methodology themes outlined above. 
The drive to develop a framework for innovation policy in this paper is governed by 
an ecologically sustainable pre-analytic vision consistent with the ecological economics 
position. Using Lowe’s ‘instrumental analysis’ and working backwards from a 
sustainable development vision of innovation, a demand-oriented public investment 
strategy can be developed that has a post-Keynesian methodology derived from the work 
of Kalecki. A framework that builds on this approach is presented in the next section. 
The final element in this framework is a complexity analysis ensuring a business 
environment that is constantly changing with incentives to innovate and specialise 
[12,p.216]. A business ecology that is continuously developing and unfolding as a 
complex system allows innovation to become embedded and intrinsic as the driver of the 
economic system as identified by Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations. This business 
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ecology needs to be congruent with the environmental ecology, something that the 
noncomplexity neoclassical economics cannot aspire to achieve. 
Complexity as a concept recognises an open system which overall 
(‘macroscopically’) creates and dissolves patterns over time, whereas the neoclassical 
approach involves reducing a closed system into its individual parts. The science of 
complexity allows investigation of open systems in which “the collective behaviour of 
many basic but interacting units evolves over time, with self-organisation and adaptation” 
[22,p.7]. This fits into the evolutionary and cumulative causation aspects of the 
investment cycle. As such the framework developed here is situated in the integration of 
post-Keynesian and evolutionary models of complexity outlined by Rosser [23] and used 
to understand Twentieth Century capitalist development by Cornwall and Cornwall [24]. 
3 The eco-sustainable framework 
This section introduces a set of economic analytics that are aimed to operate in a world of 
complexity with fundamental uncertainty and cumulative change within a framework of 
an innovative and sustainable environment. These analytics have at their base satisficing 
rather than optimising objectives in terms of policy actions. The efficiency and ethical 
reasons for public intervention towards sustainable development when there is 
fundamental (or ‘hard’) uncertainty, irreversible processes and strategic learning has been 
logically argued by Vercelli [25]. He concludes with the need for a procedural ‘designing 
rationality’ that is “aimed at designing a project of harmonious interaction between 
economic development and the natural environment and able to specify a strategy for its 
implementation” [25,p.273]. The eco-sustainable framework below is a concrete step 
towards such a policy intervention system. 
An economic framework is needed that is broadly rational in rigorous economic terms 
and also ecologically sustainable in handling ecosystem dilemmas. This eco-sustainable 
framework begins with an identifiable goal and then develops a strategy of public 
intervention in order to implement the goal. The goal is the policy perspective definition 
of sustainable development adopted by Vercelli [25,p.268]: “development could be 
considered sustainable only when generations are guaranteed a set of options at least as 
wide as that possessed by the current generation”. 
The framework outlined is based on two analyses. First is Adolph Lowe’s 
‘instrumental analysis’ as a way of using ‘instruments’ to achieve agreed goals. Lowe 
[26] established an analytical framework designed to enable rules of formal logic to be 
applied to economic cause-and-effect sequences over historical time. This framework  
is particularly aimed at using such cause-effect principles to set up state structural 
adjustment policies that can deliver a sustainable, equitable, and ecologically  
supportive economic environment. This eco-environment is the stipulated end. To Lowe 
[26,pp.11–12] it involves ‘the search for the economic means suitable for the attainment 
of any stipulated end’. To this procedure I have assigned the label of “instrumental 
analysis” [27]. 
Lowe’s ecological concern is clearly evident from early on in his writings and then 
later makes an explicit attempt “to incorporate environmental factors into his analysis” 
[20,pp.7–11]. The position taken by Lowe in these later works is to argue that industrial 
progress and the new technological revolution cannot continue to deliver the economic 
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growth rates that governments desire and corporations strategise over in advanced 
capitalist economies. Only solution put forward is the gradual redistribution of resources 
to less advanced economies with concomitant reduction in required growth rates in more 
advanced economies [28]. This is a long-term solution that needs to be supported by 
strong political vision in advanced economies, but this is very difficult to generate. While 
politically advocating for this solution, economists can use Lowe’s own instrumental 
analysis to assist achieving the same stipulated sustainable end by weaving a strategic 
innovation and investment policy regime that is strongly ecologically sensitive. Such a 
strategy could build on the recent political shift in advanced economies for public 
innovation policies that guide business towards stronger competitive advantage. 
Public policy instrumental analysis needs to concentrate on investment, which is 
central to competitive advantage but also meets the Vercelli goal of sustainable 
development. Analysis and evidence show that uncertainty by the ‘mistake-ridden private 
sector’ causes investment instability, thus undermining economic activity and 
competitive advantage [6,pp.190–192, 29]. Private corporate investment strategy that is 
best suited to innovation needs a secure business environment, but one which has public 
policies that support continuous development and change [30]. This situation potentially 
offers post-Keynesians the opportunity to influence innovation in an ecologically 
sustainable direction. In market-based economic regions or nations that lack relevant 
supportive physical and social infrastructure, there is insufficient order and coherence to 
impel the creation of innovative ecologically sustainable investment projects by the 
private sector without a state structural adjustment policy. 
Second is Michal Kalecki’s ‘perspective planning’ [31]. This is incorporated into the 
framework to provide an investment strategy to establish motivation and voluntary 
conformity towards ecologically appropriate goals. A path of dynamic diffusion of new 
technology systems, which is conducive towards innovation for a sustainable physical 
environment, needs to be established. This requires long-term investment strategies to 
have an incrementally adjusting perspective planning approach [32]. To achieve this it is 
necessary to establish specific practical short-term goals to induce innovation in 
investment that eventually adds up to the long-term goals specified. The plan must be 
continually assessed at every short-term end-point to see whether it is necessary to revise 
the goals and the strategy for reaching the broad-based long-term scenario. A perspective 
plan with these goals is set up to form a specific investment programme in consort with 
agreed ecological ‘rules’ that deliver the type of ecological sustainability determined by 
the ‘instrumental analysis’. 
In Kalecki’s planning approach, there are two specific resource-saving parameters 
that provide ecological-efficient criteria to rules formulation. One is the coefficient of 
real depreciation, the aim of which is to reduce this coefficient by proper maintenance 
and repair systems to equipment and infrastructures. The other is the coefficient of better 
utilisation of existing productive capacity. “Greater output may be obtained from existing 
plant due to improvements in the organisation of labour, more economical use of raw 
materials, elimination of faculty products, etc.” [33,p.16], thus reducing the coefficient’s 
value. Together these resource-saving coefficients provide a sound basis for ecological 
rules in a sustainable, but constrained, investment strategy. 
Barbier [34] developed some ecologically sustainable rules that could form the basis 
of any Lowe-Kalecki planning approach. These rules deal with rates of both exploitation 
of natural resources and generation of wastes that specific ecosystems can assimilate for 
long-term ‘carrying capacity’ sustainability. The problem is that different ‘stakeholders’ 
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(or interest groups) in the economy use alternative critical load carrying capacity 
measures in relation to the ecosystem. Within the context of tourism, Hoffmann [35] 
identifies three carrying capacity measures that can be applied to the ecosystem  
in general: 
(1) physical capacity as the absolute limit that a resource can cope with 
(2) ecological or real carrying capacity as the level beyond which there are unacceptable 
ecological impacts for ecologists 
(3) social or effective carrying capacity as the level beyond which unacceptable change 
occurs in the production of the good or service in terms of overcrowding and altering 
social behaviour. 
Large business interests tend to support (1), while small and local based businesses, 
public environmental bureaucracies, and ecologists tend to support (2). The direct service 
providers ‘on the ground’ (e.g., national park rangers, local environment groups,  
low-impact ecosystem-based services) tend to support (3). Kalecki’s resource-saving 
coefficients can be applied to all three capacity measures. 
The perspective planning approach needs to first set up a dialogue between all 
stakeholders on how to achieve a deeper ecosystem-sensitive market in any region or 
country using structural adjustment policies that plan to alter the economic base of that 
area. The aim is investment, not in ‘end-of-pipe’ solutions to the ecosystem, but in an 
innovative proactive strategy that significantly alters the operation of the economy using 
all the tools available in the new Information and Communication Technologies (ICT). 
This requires understanding of the possible means to develop the economy with ICT 
investment and an appreciation of the value of all three carrying capacity indicators as 
rules for monitoring, evaluating, and developing each stage in the plan. Networking 
between all the stakeholders over the goals, means, and their assessment must be rapid 
and continuous. Then processes need to be arranged where constructive dialogue 
concentrates on the means of achieving the goals based on the data available and rules 
used to assess this data. Once an investment plan has been developed, there must be 
continual reevaluation of these rules over time so that they are not static, but instead 
reflect the latest innovative technological changes. This enables the constrained 
investment strategy to be flexible and adaptable. 
Economists currently writing on ecology and environment recognise that all attempts 
to incorporate ecological concerns, whether by the market or through planning processes, 
depend on the precautionary principle. Hodge [36,p.56] explains that to have confidence 
in the effectiveness of ecological rules, “any prescriptions will have to embrace a wide 
range of capital assets and precautionary rather than optimising approaches have to be 
adopted”. The planning system behind these rules provide a level of precautionary 
confidence that induces innovation in investment that leads to revisions both in carrying 
capacities and economic growth rates for future iterative reevaluations of the perspective 
plan. This is a complexity-type cumulative and feedback process that has the ability to 
establish precautionary rules to meet the goal of sustaining the ecosystem, while regularly 
evaluating and revising the rules for getting there. Market signals and even optimal  
cost-benefit analysis beloved by neoclassical economists cannot provide such satisficing 
and precautionary guiding principles. 
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Since it is impossible to define with any certainty what sustainability requires, a  
risk-averse investment strategy needs to be initially introduced, and not based on a static 
optimising (and optimistic) cost-benefit comparison. This points to the use of the effective 
carrying capacity rate as the critical ruling measure. Over time what sustainability 
requires is a ‘shifting target’ that depends on the new information and technology that 
becomes available and on the changing attitudes and expectations adopted by the 
generation that has democratic public control [36,p.56]. This democratic control implies 
grassroots input from the people who understand and operate within the fragile ecosystem 
together with ability to influence directly the goals and means used to develop the 
ecologically sensitive economy.  
In achieving the sustainability objective, Hoffmann [35] argues for strategic alliances 
between the stakeholders. There are vast ideological and business differences between  
all the stakeholders, especially with regard to their support for different carrying capacity 
rules. Under these conditions, it seems alliance across all stakeholders will be very 
tenuous, if not impossible. Democratic control requires networking across all parties with 
specific details of the stipulated sustainable end, but then decisions on the plans  
and implementation must be arrived at by majority support. The minority, even if  
more economically powerful, must accept the need to act within the bounds of the 
majority-based plan and policies. 
Borrowing from the ‘cumulative causation’ literature [37], the Lowe-Kalecki 
ecological framework provides a growth of effective demand based on certain 
sustainability rules that establishes certainty within which innovative investment can 
flourish. Continual iterative reevaluation of the investment plan encourages further 
innovation that leads to more acceptable and internationally competitive sustainability 
rules. This creates ‘self-reinforcing internal dynamics’ that induce strong international 
competitiveness with sustainable development that delivers full employment [38]. 
In summary, this framework has three crucial elements, with post-Keynesian 
principles in brackets: 
1 Ecological rules that ensure capital investment is resource-saving with long-term 
carrying capacities which are sustainable (PK – conventions with fundamental 
uncertainty). 
2 Perspective, flexible, and risk-averse investment strategy with democratic control 
(PK – investment management and stability). 
3 Cumulative effective demand that establishes a strong market share for 
environmental-based goods and services (PK – demand-oriented stimulation). 
4 Practical application 
The eco-sustainable policy framework can be applied to the ecological sustainability 
question on the basis of recent work on sustainability rules. Three recent studies provide 
practical supportive implementation strategies for the type of framework proposed here. 
One is from a strategic business management perspective. The second is from a national 
public environmental policy perspective. The third is from an evolutionary perspective 
and its application to the specific area of transport with transition to sustainable mobility. 
All three are practical innovation strategies that do not address the investment issue.  
This section outlines how such diverse practical strategies can be incorporated into a 
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post-Keynesian innovation and investment policy. It is an approach based on dynamic 
satisficing objectives towards a stipulated sustainable goal, and it aims to encourage 
cumulative causation so that ecologically supportive innovation is enhanced over time. 
Porter and van der Linde [39] explore the central strategic management role of 
innovation by private firms in ending the stalemate between stricter environmental 
regulations (or rules) and attempts by business to roll back these rules seen as costly and 
anticompetitive. The authors reject neoclassical optimisation implied in this ‘static view 
of environmental regulation’. Firms operate in a dynamic competitive situation; 
constantly finding solutions to problems makes these firms more competitive. “Properly 
designed environmental standards can trigger innovations that lower the total cost of a 
product or improve its value” [39,p.120]. With incomplete information and limited time 
and attention by managers to assess the complex new world of environmental issues, 
rules set up by public policy makers offer a procedural rationality construct. From this 
construct firms can make satisficing environmentally supportive innovative decisions in 
the current transitional phase of the economy, as it moves into the post-industrial digital 
economy. In this new world, “Static thinking causes companies to fight environmental 
standards that actually could enhance their competitiveness” [39,p.128]. 
Using case study examples of many companies, Porter and van der Linde [39] show 
that good regulation can enhance risk-taking and experimentation within a predictable 
business and ecology setting. Where this has been successful it has been due to good 
regulation [40]. Such good regulation is clear and stable in its direction, while creating 
maximum opportunity for firms to solve innovatively the problems that rules create. 
Good rules do not lock firms into particular technology and are gradually improved in 
line with private sector technological developments. All this requires a sustainable 
investment planning process with technical change; otherwise risk and experimentation 
will not flow through into adequate production runs. 
Wallace [41] develops the same theme as Porter and van der Linde, this time from the 
perspective of an environmental public policy maker. Wallace, in his book, details many 
examples of countries that have implemented ‘good regulation’. It is possible for policy 
makers to create opportunities and incentives for firms to be innovative for a sustainable 
ecological environment. However, innovation requires strategic investment planning with 
coordination by private and public organisations. To do this well, public policy makers 
“need to understand the nature of decision making in industry; how it is conditioned by 
perceptions of markets and risk, existing technological capacities and constraints and the 
capacity for change” [41,p.22]. Six national studies and two industry case studies by 
Wallace show that this can be done. 
All the Wallace [41] studies show that successful innovation requires a secure 
corporate environment, but with the nature of corporate systemic instability, public 
control is required. Further, the studies show that clear public policy ecological directions 
and rules that allow for adaptation and incremental change bring forth the required 
corporate innovation that supports creatively the ecosystem, rather than prescriptive static 
regulations that result in ‘head-in-the-sand’ responses that favour costly ‘end-of-pipe’ 
technological solutions [41,p.17]. Nations need to set a coherent, comprehensive agenda 
for the environment that encourages flexible and innovative responses from the private 
sector. Wallace identifies The Netherlands as having taken this process the farthest, but 
there are fears from other nations of the costs of competitive disadvantage measured in 
current static neoclassical economic terms [42]. 
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Kemp et al. [43] outline public and private sector processes in the coevolution of 
technologies and industry structures towards sustainable development through the 
identification of ecologically sound niche markets that are already attractive to users. 
Here ‘Strategic Niche Management’ (SNM) can be applied. This is a process where 
experiencing learning-by-doing through these niches informs technical improvement and 
supports public and private iterative planning with the aim to expand the niche and at the 
same time encourage institutional embeddedness. The niche space is protected 
temporarily from the full force of normal selection pressures, which allows a testbed to 
incubate the new technology within a domain of genuine effective demand.  
SNM is especially suited for promoting sustainable transport, where barriers to 
ecological sustainability are strong and yet where potential for new forms of sustainable 
mobility are evident in niche markets throughout advanced and Third World economies. 
Kemp et al. [43] provide three examples of SNM in Europe: lightweight electric vehicles 
in Mendrisio, organised car sharing in Switzerland, and rolling highways in Sweden. 
What is crucial for the investment planning perspective is ‘the need of up-front 
investment in new infrastructure, production outlays and maintenance systems’ where 
there is strong attachment to existing modes of mobility and coordinating actors actions 
are difficult [43,pp.2–3]. Thus, an innovative investment strategy in concert with SNM 
can provide a clear realistic path towards technological succession as identified by [44] in 
simulation modelling exercises. 
The eco-sustainable framework provides a comprehensive approach to how an 
investment strategy can be introduced into an economy in order to derive the stipulated 
goal of an innovative, competitive and ecologically sustainable environment. Currently 
only The Netherlands has been prepared to go down this path significantly, with many of 
the elements of the Lowe-Kalecki framework in its public programme, such as: national 
strategic environment plan, short-term targets and target groups, private sector 
cooperation, voluntary conformity, citizens’ group input. This is backed by the threat of 
regulation and withdrawal of support policies like subsidies [41,pp.43–61]. Crucially 
missing from The Netherlands plan is the ability to promote innovation through 
technological succession, which is where investment planning in concert with SNM can 
provide the necessary link to new sustainable technologies.  
Figure 1 summarises the argument of this paper in the grid and provides a flowchart 
of the investment planning process on the bottom. The left column has the three pillars of 
the eco-sustainable planning framework. The centre column sets out the criteria for 
sustainable development required in both public and private sector investment planning 
within specific institutional and cultural domains. The right column shows how specific 
implementation strategies for innovation, outlined above, support the investment plan. 
The bottom row is a flowchart which indicates how one column should interact with the 
next in the planning process. The flowchart is a practical procedure for a coherent 
planning process. Each of the supporting strategies is currently in operation as separate 
entities in different places. What distinguishes this study is the appropriation of these 
actual strategies into a cohesive post-Keynesian planning framework for investment that 
allows these strategies to induce technological innovation for sustainable development. 
This then takes the strategies out of the environmental divisions of the public/private 
sectors and locates them in their central planning processes. Then, the environment is no 
longer a separate strategy, but instead a stipulated end that is integrated in the strategic 
management and planning of any (and every) organisation. 
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Figure 1 Summary of the Lowe-Kalecki sustainable development process 
Eco-sustainable 
framework 
Investment  
planning criteria 
Supporting implementation 
strategies 
Ecological rules • Sustainable long-term 
carrying capacities 
• Resource-saving new capital 
stock 
Private sector flexible 
innovation-oriented competitive 
solutions (see [39]) 
Perspective planning • Iterative flexible ex-ante 
planning 
• Bottom-up monitoring and 
evaluation 
Public sector incremental and 
adaptive environmental policies 
(see [41]) 
Cumulative effective 
demand 
• Strong niche market base 
• Experience from current  
eco-sustainable innovation-
based users 
Strategic niche management of 
eco-sustainable small markets 
(see [43]) 
Process of investment 
strategy planning in 
public and private 
sectors 
Methods of 
appropriating 
investment strategies 
Planning 
framework
The process outlined in Figure 1 is a practical application of the eco-sustainable 
framework at both the technical and political levels. At the technical level, Rip and Kemp 
[14,pp.357–64] explain how coevolution can be sustained by the use of design 
hierarchies, mapping techniques, and public sector innovation programmes. All three are 
at a highly technocratic level, but essential to bring forward radical innovations within an 
appropriate industrial structure that can survive the infant stage. The sustainable 
development process outlined above enables these technical processes to be seen as 
central for future economic development. 
At the political level, perspective planning requires the twin processes of monitoring 
and evaluation to incrementally adjust the short-term end-points while revising the  
long-term goals and scenarios. This is done at the grassroots of the organisation in order 
to sustain voluntary conformity to the broad plan objectives. The perspective plan 
approach as outlined in Kalecki [31] allows democratic control of the technocratic 
process of shifting to an ecologically sustainable path, whether this control is by private 
firm stakeholders, regional communities, national constituencies, or representatives of 
global institutions (i.e., ILO, WTO, IMF). Once the voluntary conformity requirement is 
agreed to, the investment strategy is constrained according to ecological rules. The 
process of innovation and change can be managed in this dynamically flexible manner, 
allowing the investment constraints to be adapted over time [45]. 
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For research, the Lowe-Kalecki framework provides a useful analytical device to 
assess a nation, region, industry sector, or international organisational structure in relation 
to sustainable development. The strategic planning and implementation processes can be 
assessed in terms of fitting into the eco-sustainable framework. The closer the policies 
and actions of agents come to meeting the conditions set out in this framework, the more 
effective are these actions in attaining the long-term sustainable objectives. It should be 
clear that the framework is aimed at assessing the ‘instrumental stage’ of actions and not 
any final outcome. There is no optimal end-point. Instead, there is a stipulated sustainable 
development goal that the innovation policy framework outlined above allows continued 
evolution to a more ecologically sensitive society. 
5 Conclusion 
Dominance in economics of the neoclassical ‘optimal’ rationalist approach needs to be 
replaced by an eco-sustainable ‘satisficing’ approach. As such, the neoclassical 
substitution to optimality is then converted into an analysis of the structural composition 
of sustainable output. This can only succeed if the specifics of an eco-sustainable position 
can be clearly enunciated and its vision seen to be practically achievable.  
The aim of this paper has been to spell out in some detail an eco-sustainable 
innovation policy for both the private and public sectors working within an overall 
investment planning strategy that has as its major criteria, sustainable ecological rules  
(or conventions), perspective planning, and cumulative effective demand. These three 
investment criteria are based on major post-Keynesian principles. This then addresses the 
Joan Robinson query of ‘investment in what?’ from an ecological perspective. 
Using the insights of Adolph Lowe and Michal Kalecki into investment paths, 
together with their nascent ecological concerns, an eco-sustainable framework is 
presented. This framework aims to engender innovative technological solutions that are 
ecologically sensitive. Concrete application with flexible and adaptive implementation 
strategies that already operate ad hoc in market economies is the basis for this outcome. 
The framework allows for an integration of an ecological-based investment planning 
criteria with supportive implementation strategies to deliver an effective technological 
innovation policy for sustainable development. 
Central to this post-Keynesian innovation policy framework is a theory of production 
that views capital investment as a process of the capitalist economy and does not consider 
capital stock as a natural endowment. Such a perspective provides strong basis for 
integrating ecologically sustainable development principles with post-Keynesian 
economics. 
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